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In a closed economy context there is common agreement on price inﬂation
stabilization being one of the objects of monetary policy. Moving to an open
economy context gives rise to the coexistence of two measures of inﬂation: do-
mestic inﬂation (DI) and consumer price inﬂation (CPI). Which one of the two
measures should be the target variable? This is the question addressed in this
paper. In particular, I use a small open economy model to show that once sticky
wages indexed to past CPI inﬂation are introduced, a complete inward looking
monetary policy is no more optimal. I ﬁrst, derive a loss function from a second
order approximation of the utility function and then, I compute the fully optimal
monetary policy under commitment. Then, I use the optimal monetary policy
as a benchmark to compare the performance of diﬀerent monetary policy rules.
The main result is that once a positive degree of indexation is introduced in the
model the rule performing better (among the Taylor type rules considered) is
the one targeting wage inﬂation and CPI inﬂation. Moreover this rule delivers
results very close to the one obtained under the fully optimal monetary policy
with commitment.
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11 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyse which measure of inﬂation should be
taken as target variable in an open economy framework. In a closed economy
context there is common agreement on price inﬂation stabilization being one of
the objects of monetary policy. From the ad-hoc interest rate rule proposed
by Taylor (1993), to the more recent New Keynesian literature deriving optimal
monetary policy rules from the minimization of loss functions obtained via second
order approximation of the utility of the representative consumer, the monetary
instrument has to be chosen in order to match a given inﬂation target (among
with other targets). However, moving to an open economy context gives rise
to the coexistence of two measures of inﬂation: domestic inﬂation (DI) and
consumer price inﬂation (CPI). Which one of the two measures should be the
target variable? This is the question addressed in this paper.
For this purpose I develop a small open economy model similar to the one used
by Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005). In addition to the standard assumption of sticky
prices, I also assume sticky wages indexed to past CPI inﬂation. In each period
only a fraction of workers is allowed to reoptimize while for the others I allowed
for a partial indexation to past CPI inﬂation. This will be the main diﬀerence
with the existing open economy literature. The main idea is that the volatility
of CPI and the impossibility for some workers to adjust their wages in order
to keep their mark up constant make the stabilization of CPI inﬂation relevant
in this context. In particular the assumptions on wages will produce two main
consequences: ﬁrst, given the presence of wage rigidities, strict inﬂation targeting
will no more be optimal (as Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) show in a closed
economy setup); second, if at time t there is an exogenous increase in foreign
prices such that CPI increases, this leads to an increase of nominal wages in
t + 1 (at least for workers that will not reoptimize, via the indexation channel)
therefore, other things equals, marginal cost for ﬁrms will increase in t + 1 and
so do prices. Therefore an increase of CPI inﬂation in period t will induce an
increase in DI in period t + 1. This link between CPI and DI makes it desirable
to also stabilize CPI.
As underlined by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and by Smets
and Wouters (2003), there is strong empirical evidence of wage rigidities in the
economy. Moreover Smets and Wouters (2003) estimate of the degree of wage
indexation to past inﬂation for the EURO area is around 0.65. Consequently
there is empirical evidence in favour of the importance of modelling also wage
rigidities and wage indexation.
From a practical point of view there seems to be a unanimous consensus
among central banks on CPI being the correct target. In particular, as stressed
by Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), starting from 1990 the following countries have
adopted an explicit target to CPI inﬂation: Australia, Canada, Finland, Israel,
New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, UK. In the EMU the European Central Bank’s
object is to stabilize the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HCPI) below
2%.
2In contrast, from a theoretical point of view, the answer to this question has
not yet been established. There is a related open economy literature that has
tried to address the question of which inﬂation should be taken as target vari-
able by the central bank. Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2001) analyse a small open
economy model with price rigidities and frictions in the labour market and they
ﬁnd that, as long as there is perfect exchange rate pass-through, the target of the
central bank should be DI. They do not, however, model explicitly the frictions in
the labour market and they just assume an exogenous stochastic process for the
wage mark-up. This is an important diﬀerence with the model I developed be-
cause assuming an exogenous process for the wage mark-up makes price stability
no more optimal (like in my model) but omit the link that there might be be-
tween domestic wages and foreign prices. A similar result is obtained in Gal´ ı and
Monacelli (2005)1 where strict DI targeting turns out to be the optimal monetary
policy, consequently outperforming a CPI targeting rule. In Clarida, Gal´ ı and
Gertler (2002) they present a two country model with sticky prices and they show
that in the case of no coordination the two monetary authorities should adjust
the interest rate in response to DI. On the other side Corsetti and Pesenti (2005)
use a two country model with ﬁrm’s prices set one period in advance to show that
”inward-looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when ﬁrms’
markups are exposed to currency ﬂuctuations”. This argument would became
less convincing in a currency area given that ﬁrms there would be less exposed
to currency ﬂuctuations (only ﬁrms trading with countries outside the currency
area would be aﬀected by currency ﬂuctuations). In contrast, my results do not
depend on ﬂuctuations of the exchange rate and therefore can be extended to
the case of a currency area and are more suitable to explain the behaviour of the
ECB. Svensson (2000) uses a small open economy framework to analyse inﬂa-
tion targeting monetary policies and he underlines that ”all inﬂation-targeting
countries have chosen to target CPI inﬂation...None of them has chosen to target
domestic inﬂation”. Given this consideration he assumed an ad-hoc loss function
that includes both CPI and DI in addition to other variables. The result of the
model (that is not fully microfounded) is that ﬂexible CPI inﬂation targeting is
better than ﬂexible DI targeting.
The ﬁrst result of the paper is that from the Phillips Curve (computed both
for wage inﬂation and for DI) it is clear that there is a link between DI, CPI
and wage inﬂation. Given this link it is clearly diﬃcult to stabilize DI without
stabilizing also CPI and wage inﬂation. In order to get a more precise analysis
of what should a Central Bank do I derived the loss function as a second order
approximation of the utility function and I compute the fully optimal monetary
policy under commitment. Diﬀerently from Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005) I obtain
a loss function that, in addition to output gap and home inﬂation, depends also
on CPI inﬂation and wage inﬂation. Given the presence of both price and wage
rigidities, price stabilization is no more the optimal monetary policy. The object
1Under the assumptions of log utility in consumption and unit elasticity of substitution among
foreign goods.
3of the paper is to use the optimal monetary policy as a benchmark to compare
diﬀerent, implementable, monetary policy rules. In the choice of possible targets
for monetary policy I disregard the output gap, that cannot be considered a
feasible target since it is not clear how to estimate the natural level of output,
and I concentrate on the other three variables that appear in the loss function.
I focus on Taylor’s type rules targeting two of the three variables. I simulate the
model under these monetary policy rules in order to make a ranking among them.
I do this exercise for diﬀerent degrees of wage indexation in order to analyse how
this feature of the model aﬀects the results. In the case of no indexation an
inward-looking monetary policy targeting DI and wage inﬂation is, among the
policy rules considered, the one performing better. But as soon as a positive
degree of indexation is introduced in the model this is no more true and the
policy rule performing better is a Taylor rule targeting CPI inﬂation and wage
inﬂation. Increasing the level of indexation reinforces the results. Simulating
the model under the optimal monetary policy rule and under the Taylor type
rules and looking at the correlations among the series simulated in the diﬀerent
scenarios, it is clear that, at least for a positive degree of indexation, the Taylor
rule targeting at CPI and wage inﬂation delivers a behaviour of the economy
that is very close to the one obtained under the optimal rule.
These results therefore conﬁrm the original hypothesis that the introduction
of wage indexation would have aﬀected the ranking among policy rules giving
more importance to the stabilization of CPI inﬂation, i.e. making more desirable
a monetary policy that is not completely inward-looking.
The structure of the paper is the following: section 2 introduces the open
economy model, section 3 presents the analysis of the loss function, section 4
computes the optimal monetary policy under commitment, section 5 shows how
diﬀerent, implementable, monetary policy rules perform under diﬀerent degrees
of indexation and section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Like in Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005), there is a continuum [0,1] of small, identical,
countries. Diﬀerently from the original model, I introduce the assumption of
monopolistic competition on the supply side of labour market. I also assume
the presence of wage rigidities. It is worthy to note that one of the two basic
assumptions of the model is that markets are complete, so that households diﬀer
in the amount of labour supplied (consequence of the presence of sticky wages)
but share the same consumption. The second assumption is that the law of one
price holds for individual goods at all times. From now on I will use ”h” as index
for a particular household, ”i” to refer to a particular country and ”j” as sector






βt [U(Ct) + V (Nt(h))] (1)

















where α represents the degree of openness, and CH,t and CF,t are two aggregate









































The parameter θp > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between two vari-
eties of goods, while the parameter η > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution
between home produced goods and goods produced abroad. Each household h
maximizes (1) under a sequence of budget constraints. The results regarding
the optimal allocation of expenditure across goods are not aﬀected by the intro-
duction of monopolistic competition in the labour market so, using the results
of Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005), I can directly write the budget constraint after
having aggregated over goods:
PtCt + Et [Qt,t+1Dt+1] ≤ Dt + (1 + τw)Wt(h)Nt(h) + Tt (6)
where Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor, Dt is the payoﬀ in t of the portfolio
held in t−1, Tt is a lump-sum transfer (or tax), τw is a subsidy to labour income
and Pt is the aggregate price index:
Pt ≡
h


























Each household supplies a diﬀerentiated labour service in each sector, so that
the total labour supplied by household h is given by Nt(h) =
R 1
0 Nt,h(j)dj.
Consequently, he will maximize (1) subject to the demand for labour. Given









, the cost minimization problem of ﬁrms yields







where θw > 1 represents the elasticity of substitutions between workers and the






In each period only a fraction (1 − ξw) of households can reset wages optimally.
For the fraction ξw of households that cannot reset wages optimally I allow for
a partial indexation to past CPI inﬂation. Another way to think about it is
that in each period there is a fraction of workers that ﬁnd it easier, instead of
fully reoptimize, just to follow a simple rule (like assumed in Christiano et al.
(2005) for ﬁrms) trying to preserve their real wages. That is why the indexation
is to CPI and not to domestic inﬂation. Like Smets and Wouters (2003), I have
introduced the parameter γw so that will be possible to study, later on, how
certain results may be aﬀected by diﬀerent degrees of indexation. Therefore the




where Πt is the CPI inﬂation. Each household that can reoptimise in t will choose
Wt(h) considering the hypothesis that he will not be able to reoptimise any more
in the future. Consequently he will maximize (1) under (6) and (11) taking into
account the probability of not being allowed to reoptimise in the future. The


















6with ΠtT = ΠtΠt+1....ΠT−1 =
Pt+T−1
Pt−1 . From (13) it is clear that the solution
f Wt(h) will be the same for all households that are allowed to reoptimise in t. To














Pt+T is the real wage, MRSt = −
VN,t
UC,t and b Ψt+T and d MRSt+T(h)
are the log deviations from their levels with ﬂexible prices. Rearranging terms I
get the following equation for the optimal wage:
log f Wt = −log(1−Φw)+(1−βξw)Et
∞ X
T=0
(βξw)T [logMRSt+T(h) + logPt+T − γw logΠtT]
(15)
where log(1 − Φw) = log(1 + τw) − log(µw) and µw = θw
θw−1 is the wage markup.
Whenever τw = 1
θw−1 then Φw = 0 and the ﬁscal policy completely eliminates
the distortion caused by the presence of monopolistic competition in the supply
of labour. When instead τw < 1
θw−1, then −log(1 − Φw) > 0 and a distortion is
present in the economy2. From now on I will assume the following speciﬁcation
for the utility function:







Given this speciﬁcation, and with some algebra, I get the following expression:


















t = log(Wt) − log(Pt) − log(MRSt) + log(1 − Φw). The optimal wage
today will be higher the higher the expectations about future wages. Future CPI
2Note that if θw
θw−1 = 1 + τw the ﬁscal policy is able to completely eliminate the distortion arising
from labour markets. Following Woodford (2003) I’m deﬁning 1 − Φw = (1 + τw)θw−1
θw where Φw
represents the distortion in the economy. Whenever Φw > 0 the level of employment in the ﬂexible
price equilibrium will be lower than the one that we would have without distortions. When doing
welfare analysis I’ll assume for simplicity Φw = 0 but now I can consider the more general case.
7inﬂation has instead a negative impact because of indexation. In particular, the
higher the level of indexation and the higher the expected future CPI inﬂation,
the lower will be the optimal wage today. This is because agents know that even if
they will not be allowed to reoptimise in the near future, their wages will increase
anyway because of indexation. This eﬀect would disappear with γ = 0. Note that
with the labour subsidy in place the distortion in the labour market is lower than
the one that we would have without subsidy, indeed −log(µw) < log(1−Φw) ≤ 0.
Still, b µw
t = 0 means that the wage charged is higher then the one that would be
charged with perfect competition on the labour market. So, even if the monetary
authority manages to eliminate the distortions arising from the nominal rigidities,
the level of employment will be lower then the natural one, unless Φw = 0.
The next step is to analyse the corresponding Phillips Curve on wage inﬂation.
Given that the fraction (1 − ξw) of households that is allowed to reoptimise will
choose the same wage, while the others will follow the indexation rule, I can
rewrite the aggregate wage index as:
Wt =
h






The log linearized version of this equation is given by:
logWt = (1 − ξw)log f Wt + ξw logWt−1 + γwξw logΠt−1 (19)
It is useful to rewrite (17) in the following way:




t + (1 − βξw)logWt (20)
From now on all the lower case letters denote the log of the variables. Combining
(20) with (19), I obtain:
πw
t = −λwb µw
t + βEt[πw





1+ϕθw. As in the case of no indexation, current wage inﬂation
depends positively on the expected future wage inﬂation and negatively on the
deviation of the markup from its frictionless level. In particular when b µw
t > 0
the markup charged is higher then its optimal level, that’s way wages respond
negatively to a positive b µw
t . This result is consistent with the one obtained
in Gal´ ı (2003) in the closed economy case with no indexation. The presence
of indexation introduces two new elements: a negative impact of current CPI
inﬂation and a positive impact of past CPI inﬂation. For what concern present
inﬂation, because of indexation households know that, even if they will not be
able to change wages in the next period, their wages will increase because of
the link with current inﬂation, so there is no need to increase them today. Past
inﬂation, instead, has a positive impact on current wage inﬂation because agents
that are not allowed to reoptimize in t will see their wages increase because of
indexation.
82.1.2 Consumption Decisions










with Rt = 1
Et[Qt,t+1].
2.2 Firms
The production function of an home ﬁrm in sector j is given by:
Yt(j) = AtNt(j) (23)
with at ≡ log(At) and
at+1 = ρaat + εA,t. (24)










Up to a ﬁrst order approximation Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005) demonstrate that:
yt = at + nt (26)
In each period only a fraction (1 − ξp) of ﬁrms can reset prices optimally.
Given that the elasticity of substitution between varieties of ﬁnal goods is
θp > 1, the markup that each ﬁrm would like to charge is µp =
θp
θp−1. Assuming
the presence of a subsidy τp to the ﬁrm’s output, optimal price setting of a home













where MCt represents the nominal marginal cost. Like for wages, it is useful to
deﬁne 1−Φp ≡ (1+τp)
θp−1
θp , where Φp indicates the distortion due to monopoly
power on the ﬁrm side that is still present in the economy after the intervention
of the ﬁscal authority. If the ﬁscal authority optimally choose τp in order to
exactly oﬀset the monopoly distortion then Φp = 0. If Φw > 0 and/or Φp > 0
then the ﬂexible price allocation will deliver an output and an employment level
lower then the natural ones.
From the log-linear approximation of (27) around the steady state it is possible
to derive the standard log-linear optimal price rule:
9e pH,t = −log(1 − Φp) + (1 − βξp)Et
∞ X
T=0
(βξp)T[mct+T + pH,t] (28)
where e pH,t represents the (log of) price chosen by the ﬁrms that are allowed to
reoptimise in t, and mct represents the (log of) real marginal cost.
2.3 Equilibrium Conditions
To close the model some relations between home and foreign variables are needed.
A ”star” will be used to denote world variables. The following equations3 are
the ones obtained by Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005):
C∗









PH,t are the eﬀective terms of trade and (30) represents the interna-
tional risk sharing condition. The market clearing condition is given by:
Yt = CtSα
t (31)
The world output is assumed to follow an exogenous law of motion:
y∗
t+1 = ρyy∗
t + εy,t. (32)
The terms of trade can be expressed also in function of the aggregate and the
home price indexes:
αst = pt − pH,t (33)
The relation between the home output and the world output is given by:
st = σα(yt − y∗
t) (34)
with σα ≡ σ
1−α+αω > 0 and ω ≡ ση + (1 − α)(ση − 1)
2.4 The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
The relation between domestic inﬂation and real marginal cost is not aﬀected by
the presence of sticky wages:
πH,t = βEt[πH,t+1] + λ c mct (35)
3All these relations, with the only exception of (29) that is an exact relation, hold exactly only
under the assumption that σ = η = 1. Otherwise they hold up to a ﬁrst order approximation.
10with λ ≡
(1−βξp)(1−ξp)
ξp and with c mct, log deviation of the real marginal cost
from its level in absence of nominal rigidities (i.e. c mct = mct − mc with mc =
log(1 − Φp)). The presence of sticky wages leads to an additional term in the
standard equation relating the marginal cost with the output gap (the derivation
is in the appendix):
c mct = (σα + ϕ)(yt − yt) + b µw
t (36)
When wages are fully ﬂexible b µw
t = 0. When wages are sticky this is no more
true and in particular, when b µw
t > 0, the markup charged by workers is higher
then the optimal one and ﬁrms bear a higher real marginal cost. Consequently
the NKPC for a small open economy with both price and wage rigidities is:
πH,t = βEt[πH,t+1] + λ(σα + ϕ)(yt − yt) + λb µw
t (37)
Even assuming that the only distortions left in the economy are the ones gen-
erated by the presence of nominal rigidities, clearly as in Erceg et al. (2000),
since it is not possible to stabilize at the same time the home inﬂation, the wage
inﬂation and the output gap, the ﬂexible price allocation is no longer a feasible
target. Is it still true then, that a Taylor rule targeting the home inﬂation is
the one that performs better? It can be interesting to analyse the impact of an
increase in pt on πH,t. To keep the wage markup constant wages should increase
to oﬀset the change in prices but, because of stickiness, this is not possible for
all households, so some of them will charge a wage that is lower than the desired
one and b µw
t will become negative. This will have a negative impact on home
inﬂation. On the other hand, because of indexation to past inﬂation, in t + 1
the aggregate wage index will increase and so will do b µw
t+1. This will lead to
an increase of EtπH,t+1. So, other things equal, an increase in pt will for sure
cause an increase of πH,t+1, whereas the impact on current home inﬂation is not
clear. Given this link between home inﬂation, CPI inﬂation and wage inﬂation,
it seems reasonable to postulate that targeting only one of these variables may
not be optimal because, if CPI and wage inﬂation are very volatile, it will be
hard to stabilize only home inﬂation.
To prove this conjecture, in the next section, I will derive the welfare function
from a second order approximation of the utility of the representative household.
I will then use the welfare function to study the behavior of the economy under
optimal monetary policy. Finally, using the results under optimal monetary pol-
icy as benchmark, I will compare diﬀerent welfare losses obtained using diﬀerent,
implementable, policy rules.
3 Welfare function
Before starting with the welfare analysis it is important to underline that in
the open economy model there are 5 distortions: monopolistic power in both
11goods and labour markets; nominal rigidities in both wages and prices; incen-
tives to generate exchange rate appreciation. In a closed economy framework
to require Φw = Φp = 0 is enough to ensure that the ﬂexible price allocation
will coincide with the optimal one, but this is no more true in an open economy.
As emphasised by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), a monetary expansion has two
consequences in this context: it increases the demand for domestically produced
goods and it deteriorates the terms of trade of domestic consumers. So in some
cases the monetary authority may have the incentive to generate an exchange
rate appreciation, even at the cost of a level of output (employment) lower than
the optimal one. From now on I will assume σ = η = 1 (i.e. log utility in con-
sumption and unit elasticity of substitution between home produced goods and
goods produced abroad). In this case the equilibrium conditions derived in 2.3
hold exactly and maximizing (1) under the production function Yt = AtNt, (31)




= (1 − α)A1−αN−α(Y ∗)α (38)
The solution is a constant, optimal, level of employment N = (1 − α)
1
1+ϕ. Let’s
now analyse under which conditions the ﬂexible price equilibrium delivers the
optimal allocation. Under ﬂexible prices in every period b µw
t = c mct = 0 holds.











Once having substituted for the optimal level of N, (39) tells how the two subsi-
dies should be set in order to attain the optimal allocation in the ﬂexible prices
equilibrium. From now on I will assume that the subsidies are set such that the
ﬂexible price equilibrium coincides with the Pareto optimum4.
All households have the same level of consumption but diﬀerent levels of
labour. For this reason, when computing the welfare function, we need to average
the disutility of labour across agents:




From now on all the variables of the type b at represent log deviations from the
steady state.
The second order approximation of the welfare function leads to5:
Wt − W =




t(h)] + o(kak3) (41)
4In the simulation I set Φw = 0 and consequently, 1 − Φp = 1 − α.
5The derivations of the equations in this section are in appendix B.
12The approximation of the two expected values leads to:
Eh[b nt(h)] =
b yt − at +
1
2θp





V arh[b nt(h)] + o(kak3) (42)
Eh[b n2
t(h)] = V arh[b nt(h)] + [Eh[b nt(h)]]2 (43)
Having chosen optimally τp and τw, the following holds −V NN = (1−α). Then
using this relation and substituting (42) and (43) into (41) the second order
approximation of the welfare function around the steady state become:
Wt − W =
(1 − α)at −
(1 − α)
2θp
V arj[b yt(j)] −
(1 − α)(1 + ϕθw)
2θw
V arh[b nt(h)] +
−
(1 − α)(1 + ϕ)
2
(b yt − at)2 + o(kak3) (44)
Computing the approximation around the steady state of the welfare function in
absence of nominal rigidities leads to6:
Wn
t − W =
(1 − α)at −
(1 − α)(1 + ϕ)
2
(b yn





(1 − α)(1 + ϕ)
2
(b y2
t − (b yn





V arj[b yt(j)] −
(1 − α)(1 + ϕθw)
2θw
V arh[b nt(h)] + o(kak3) (46)
Log-linearizing equation (38) I get at = b yn
t .

















V arj [b yt(j)] +
1 + ϕθw
θw
V arh [b nt(h)]
#
(47)
6With ﬂexible prices and wages there are no diﬀerences across workers and ﬁrms so V arf = V arh =
0
13where xt = b yt − b yn
t = yt − yn












It remains to study V arh[b nt(h)]. Let’s ﬁrst write the log linear labour demand
faced by each household:
b nt(h) = −θw log(Wt(h)) + θw log(Wt) + b nt + o(kak2) (49)
consequently:
V arh[b nt(h)] = θ2
wV arh[wt(h)] (50)
with wt(h) = log(Wt(h)).




βtV arh[ b wt(h)] =
ξw













































































From the comparison between this equation and the one obtained by Gal´ ı
and Monacelli (2005) it emerges that the loss function is aﬀected by two extra
terms: the variance of wage inﬂation and the variance of CPI inﬂation. It is
interesting to compare the coeﬃcients of the two price inﬂations. Assuming that
ξp = ξw and that θp = θw, CPI inﬂation has a higher weight than domestic
inﬂation in the loss function whenever γw >
q
1
β(1+ϕθw). Clearly, the higher
the level of wage indexation, the more important it will be to stabilize CPI
14inﬂation. Also, the higher ϕ and θw (and θp) the more likely it is that the
previous condition will be satisﬁed. So depending on the calibration of the model
and in particular depending on the level of wage indexation, it may be that the
loss function is more sensible to variation in CPI inﬂation than to variation in
DI. Clearly this is not enough to say which variable to target. For this reason I
ﬁrst analyse the behaviour of the economy under fully optimal monetary policy
with commitment. Afterward, using the results with optimal monetary policy as
a benchmark, I simulate the model under diﬀerent, ad-hoc, policy rules, to make
a ranking among them (section 5).
4 Optimal monetary policy with commitment
In this section, following Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) and Giannoni and
Woodford (2002), I compute the fully optimal monetary policy under commit-
ment.
The ﬁrst step, in order to make optimal monetary policy easier to compute,
is to reduce the original system of equations fully characterizing the model (see

































t + εy,t. (59)
at+1 = ρaat + εA,t. (60)
With the inclusion of a monetary policy rule, equations (55), (56), (57) and (58)
deﬁne the variables xt, πh,t, πw,t, πt and wt, while the last two equations deﬁne
the low of motion of the two exogenous shocks.
15To compute the optimal monetary policy under commitment the central bank
has to choose {xt,πh,t,πw,t,πt,wt}∞

























subject to the sequence of constraints deﬁned by equations (55), (56), (57) and
(58).
Before presenting the ﬁrst order conditions it is interesting to note that in
a closed economy contest Giannoni and Woodford (2002) compute the optimal
monetary policy in a model with sticky wages indexed to past inﬂation and in
their case the model is fully characterized by equations (56), (57) and (58). On
the other hand Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005) have a small open economy without
wage rigidities and to compute optimal monetary policy is enough to consider
(58), therefore is not only the open economy aspect of this paper that makes (55)
necessary. Actually is a combination of the open economy assumption plus the
presence of wages rigidity. Like in Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005), the behavior of DI is
determined by the Phillips Curve while CPI is determined by equation (90) that
links CPI with DI and the terms of trade. In Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005) there is no
need to consider this equation while studying optimal monetary policy because
nor the welfare function neither the NKPC contain the CPI. Here instead, the
CPI enters the NKPC on wage inﬂation both throw the indexation channel and
throw the real wage and that’s why I need to consider also equation (55) as a
constraint (even in the case of no indexation).
The FOCs of this problem are (Φi,t is the lagrange multiplier associated to
the constraint i):
• xt :
















πt + Φ1,t + Φ2,t − ξwγwβΦ3,t + γwβΦ3,t+1 = 0 (65)
7Giannoni and Woodford (2002) do the optimization including also the IS equation among the
constraints and maximizing also with respect to the interest rate. Following Clarida et al. (1999) I have
divided the problem in two steps. I ﬁrst maximize the welfare with respect to {xt,πh,t,πw,t,πt,wt}∞
t=0
without considering the IS. Then, once obtained the optimal responses of those variables to the
exogenous shocks, I can use the IS in order to see how the interest rate has to be set under optimal
monetary policy.
16• wt :
Φ2,t − βΦ2,t+1 − Φ3,tλw + λΦ4,t = 0 (66)
Equations (62)-(66) plus the constraints (55)-(58) fully characterize the behaviour
of the economy under optimal monetary policy. Using the Uhlig’s toolkit8 I can
solve the system of equations and study the behavior of the variables under op-
timal monetary policy. In the next section I consider several, implementable,
policy rules and I analyse how well they perform using the optimal monetary
policy as the benchmark case.
5 Evaluation of diﬀerent policy rules
The original question was if, once wage rigidities are introduced in a small open
economy, it is better to have a inward-looking monetary policy (like in Gal´ ı and
Monacelli (2005)),or if it is preferable an outward-looking monetary policy. To
answer this question I will compare the performance of several rules.
5.1 Implementable policy rules
The welfare loss is function of π, πH, πw and the output gap. In the choice of
possible targets for monetary policy I disregard the output gap, that cannot be
considered a feasible target since it is not clear how to estimate the natural level
of output. I therefore concentrate on the other three variables. I consider Taylor
type rules targeting two of the three variables, i.e. I consider the following rules:
rt = ρ + φpπt + φp,HπH,t (67)
rt = ρ + φpπt + φwπw,t (68)
rt = ρ + φp,HπH,t + φwπw,t (69)
Instead of imposing a priori given coeﬃcients for φp, φp,H and φw I chose
the values minimizing the welfare loss for a given grid of parameters9. I did
this exercise for diﬀerent degrees of wage indexation in order to analyse how
this feature of the model aﬀects the results. The zero indexation case is the
benchmark.
5.2 Calibration of the parameters
Most of the parameters have been calibrated like in Erceg et al. (2000). The
average contract duration is one quarter, i.e. ξp = ξw = 0.75. The elasticity
of substitution between workers and between goods are θp = θw = 4. The
discount factor is β = 0.99. The productivity shock follows an AR(1) process
with ρa = 0.95. The exogenous shock to productivity is an i.i.d with mean
8To simulate the model I used the Matlab program developed by Harald Uhlig. See Uhlig (1995).
9I used a grid from 1 to 5 with intervals of 0.25 for both the parameters in the Taylor rule.
17zero and standard deviation σa = 0.0071. The parameters related to the open
economy part are calibrated following Gal´ ı and Monacelli (2005): α = 0.4 and
the world output follows an AR(1) process with ρy = 0.86. The exogenous shock
to world output is i.i.d with zero mean and with standard deviation σy = 0.0078.
The correlation between the two exogenous shocks is corra,y = 0.3. Since the
loss function has been derived under the assumption σ = η = 1 I keep this
assumption in the simulation. Finally ϕ = 3, i.e. the labour supply elasticity is
set equal to 1
3. For what concern the level of wage indexation I simulated the
model under diﬀerent parameter values for γw in order to be able to evaluate the
impact of diﬀerent degrees of indexation on the results.
5.3 Performance of diﬀerent monetary policy rules
The purpose of this section is twofold: ﬁrst, I want to make a ranking among
the ad-hoc policy rules deﬁned before in order to ﬁnd the one performing better;
second, I want to quantitatively evaluate how close they are to the optimal mon-
etary policy. To this end, the ﬁrst step is to simulate the model under diﬀerent
policy rules and to compute the welfare losses associated to each of them. This
allows me to make a ranking among the policy rules. Clearly, in general, two
rules could deliver exactly the same loss and, nonetheless, be diﬀerent, i.e. they
could generate very diﬀerent impulse responses to the exogenous shocks. There-
fore, to have more conclusive results, I study not only the losses associated to
diﬀerent policy rules, but also the standard deviations of the variable of interest
and the correlations between the simulated series obtained under optimal mon-
etary policy and the ones obtained under the diﬀerent Taylor rules. This last
measure is particularly interesting because the more the correlation is close to
one, the more I can ”safely” say that the rule is close to the optimal one.
In table 1 are reported the welfare losses associated both to the optimal
policy rule and to the Taylor rules. With no indexation the rule performing best
(among the Taylor type rules) is the one targeting both DI and wage inﬂation.
The loss associated to this rule is very close to the one obtained under optimal
monetary policy. Anyway, the Taylor targeting at CPI and wage inﬂation delivers
a loss only slightly bigger while the Taylor targeting at CPI and DI delivers
a loss that is roughly 6.6 times bigger than the one observed under optimal
monetary policy. Therefore, only looking at the welfare losses, when there is
no indexation, the inward-looking monetary policy (i.e. the one targeting at DI
and wage inﬂation) seems to perform slightly better than the outward-looking
one (i.e. the one targeting at CPI and wage inﬂation). But as soon as a positive
degree of indexation is introduced this result drastically changes because the rule
performing better is the one targeting CPI and wage inﬂation. In particular, it
can be observed that even with high degrees of wage indexation, the loss delivered
by this rule is always around 1.2 times the one obtained with the optimal rule,
whereas when targeting DI and wage inﬂation the loss can be even 3.8 times
the one obtained under optimal monetary policy. Therefore this ﬁrst analysis
support the original intuition that the introduction of wage indexation makes it
18desirable for monetary policy to move from an inward-looking monetary policy
to a rule targeting the CPI inﬂation. The second step is to understand how much
this rule is close to the optimal one.
In table 2 are reported the standard deviations of output gap, DI, CPI and
wage inﬂation under diﬀerent rules, for diﬀerent degrees of wage indexation. The
original intuition that, given the link between CPI inﬂation and wage inﬂation
trough the indexation mechanism, it would have been diﬃcult to stabilize DI
inﬂation without stabilizing CPI, is conﬁrmed by the analysis of the standard
deviations. Indeed, when the monetary authority uses the Taylor rule target-
ing CPI and wage inﬂation, the standard deviation of DI is lower than when
the target variables are DI and wage inﬂation. Also, the standard deviation of
wage inﬂation is always lower when the target variable is CPI than when is DI.
Therefore, from the analysis of table 2, it can be concluded that the Taylor rule
targeting at CPI and wage inﬂation delivers a welfare loss lower than the ones
obtained with the other two rules because it reduces the overall variance of the
main variables.
The analysis of the variances is useful in understanding where the losses come
from. Still, it could be the case that two rules deliver exactly the same variances
but generate very diﬀerent responses to the exogenous shocks. Therefore the
last step is the study of the correlations among the series simulated using the
fully optimal monetary policy rule and the ones simulated using the Taylor rules.
When there is no wage indexation none of the three Taylor rules seems to deliver
a behaviour of the economy close to the one observed under the fully optimal
monetary policy, indeed the correlations computed for the series of output gap,
CPI, DI and wage inﬂation are between 0.16 and 0.28. While the analysis of the
welfare loss and of the standard deviations does not really allow to discriminate
between the inward-looking and the outward-looking Taylor rule, looking at the
correlations it is clear the the inward-looking Taylor rule is the closest to the
optimal rule, even if the correlations are quite small. Things change drastically
as soon as a positive degree of wage indexation is introduced. Indeed now using
the Taylor rule with CPI and wage inﬂation, the correlations of CPI, DI and
output gap are between 0.95 and 0.98. The wage inﬂation series seem instead
to be uncorrelated under this rule. For higher levels of wage indexation instead,
the correlation computed for wage inﬂation is around 0.80 and there is no doubt
that under the outward-looking Taylor rule, the reaction of the variables to the
exogenous shocks is very close to what it would be observed under the fully
optimal monetary policy rule with commitment.
6 Conclusions
The starting point of this paper was to analyse whether the introduction of
wage rigidities in a small open economy model was enough to justify why a
central bank should care not only about domestic inﬂation but also about CPI
inﬂation. As in the closed economy case, once both kinds of nominal rigidities
19are present, it is no more possible to reach the ﬂexible price allocation because
it is not possible to stabilize at the same time price inﬂation, wage inﬂation
and the output gap. Given this, an interesting question was if it were still true
that targeting home inﬂation is the best that a central bank can do and, if
not, how the new results are aﬀected by the presence of wage indexation. To
this purpose I derived the loss function from a second order approximation of
the welfare function. Compared with the one obtained by Gal´ ı and Monacelli
(2005), the presence of sticky wages makes the loss function depending also on
V ar[πw,t] while the presence of indexation introduces, in addition to V ar[πH,t],
also the volatility of CPI, V ar[πt]. Then, I used the loss function to derive the
optimal monetary policy with commitment.The next step has been to simulate
the model under diﬀerent, implementable, monetary policy rules, in order to
make a ranking among them, using the optimal monetary policy as a benchmark.
With zero indexation a Taylor type rule targeting wage inﬂation and DI is the
rule performing best among the one considered. Still, computing the correlations
among the simulated series of the main variables under this rule and under the
optimal monetary policy, it is clear that the inward-looking Taylor rule can not
be considered as a good approximation of the optimal rule since the correlation
coeﬃcients are below 0.30. When I allow for a positive degree of indexation
the rule performing better is the Taylor targeting at CPI and wage inﬂation.
In this case not only the volatility of the variables are very close to the ones
obtained under the optimal rules, but also the correlations coeﬃcients are very
high (bigger than 0.95 in many cases). Therefore, going back to the question of
the title, these results conﬁrm the opportunity of targeting at CPI instead of DI.
A Derivation of d mct
Making use of some of the equilibrium conditions deﬁned in (2.3), the real
marginal cost can be written as:
mct = wt − pH,t − at
= mrst + log(µw
t ) + pt − pH,t − at
= σ ∗ y∗
t + (1 − α)st + ϕ(yt − at) + α ∗ st − at + log(µw
t )
= (σ − σα)y∗
t + (σα + ϕ)yt − (1 + ϕ)at + log(µw
t ) (70)
where µw
t represents the actual markup charged in each period10. From equation
















10Note that with the presence of taxes that exactly oﬀset the monopoly distortions, the wedge
between the real wage and the mrst is do only to the presence of stickiness, whereas when Φw > 0
then µw
t reﬂects both the presence of stickiness and the presence of monopoly power.

























that is exactly equation (36).
B Derivation of the loss function
B.1 Derivation of Wt − W
All the results in this section are derived under the assumption σ = η = 1. Under
this assumption the relations deﬁned in (2.3) hold exactly and I can derive a
second order approximation of the utility function using ﬁrst order approximation
of the structural equations. I will substitute the following expression of the second
order derivative: VNN = ϕ ∗ VNN−1. I will also use the fact that:
Xt − X
X




t + o(kak3) (74)
Up to a second order approximation it is true that:
U(Ct) =
+U(C) + UC(Ct − C) +
1
2
UCC(Ct − C)2 + o(kak3) (75)
Using (74) and the relations between consumption and output deﬁned in (2.3)the
previous equation becomes:
U(Ct) − U(C) = b ct + o(kak3)
= (1 − α)b yt + o(kak3) (76)
In an analogous way it’s true that:
EhV (Nt(h)) =
V (N) + Eh[V N(Nt − N)] +
1
2
Eh[V NN(Nt − N)2] + o(kak3) (77)
that using (74) and the relation between ﬁrst order and second order derivatives
leads to:
21Eh[V (Nt(h),Zt)] =









Combining (76) and (78) I get equation (41).
B.2 Derivation of Eh[b nt(h)]




φ it’s true that11 b at = Ei[b a(i)] + 1
2φ ∗
V ari[b a(i)] + o(kak3), then given the way in which aggregate labour has been
deﬁned, I can write:





V arh[b nt(h)] + o(kak3) (79)
Following Erceg et al. (2000), it is useful to write b nt in function of the aggregate
demand of labour by ﬁrms Nt =
R 1
0 Nt(f)df:
b nt = Ef[b nt(f)] +
1
2
V arf[b nt(f)] + o(kak3) (80)
Clearly, since b yt(f) = at+b nt(f), then V arf[b nt(f)] = V arf[b yt(f)] and Ef[b nt(f)] =
Ef[b yt(f)] − at. Also, given the expression for aggregate output, Ef[b yt(f)] =
b yt − 1
2
θp−1
θp V arf[b yt(f)] + o(kak3), so I can write:





V arh[b nt(h)] + o(kak3)
= Ef[b yt(f)] − at +
1
2





V arh[b nt(h)] + o(kak3)
= b yt − at +
1
2θp





V arh[b nt(h)] + o(kak3) (81)
B.3 Derivation of V arh[wt(h)]
First it is useful to decompose the variance as12:
V arh[wt(h)] = Eh[wt(h) − Ehwt(h)]2
= ξwEh[wt−1(h) + γwπt−1 − Ehwt(h)]2
+(1 − ξw)[ e wt − Ehwt(h)] (82)
11The reference for the results in this section is Erceg et al. (2000).
12In general, if X assumes value X1 with probability α and X2 with probability (1 − α), then
E(X2) = α ∗ X2
1 + (1 − α)X2
2, but the fraction of workers that can not reoptimise in t will all have a
diﬀerent wage, that’s why, like in Erceg et al. (2000), I need to take expectations again.
22Using the log-linearized expression for the aggregate wage and the result by Erceg
et al. (2000) that wt − Ehwt(h) = o(kak2) then,
Eh[wt−1(h) + γwπt−1 − Ehwt(h)]2 = Eh[wt−1(h) + γwπt−1 − ξwEhwt−1(h) − ξwγwπt−1 +
−(1 − ξw) e wt]2
= Eh[wt−1(h) + γwπt−1 − wt + o(kak2)]2
= Eh[wt−1(h) − Ehwt−1(h) + γwπt−1 − πw,t + o(kak2)]2
= V arhwt−1 + π2
w,t + γ2
wπ2
t−1 + o(kak3) (83)
With the same arguments I have:











Substituting (83) and (84) into (82) I can write:










Like in Woodford (2001), let’s deﬁne 4w













t−1 + o(kak3) (86)

























































−1 is a t.i.p. like it was 4w
−1. With this consideration equation (88) became
equation (51) in the text.
23C System of equations fully characterizing
the model
With the inclusion of a monetary policy rule the following system of equations
fully characterize the model:
αst = αst−1 + πt − πh,t (90)






yt = at + nt (93)
πw,t = wt + πt − wt−1 (94)
wt = log(Wt/Pt)
st = yt − y∗
t (95)
xt = yt − yt (96)
ct = −[rt − ρ − Etπt+1] + Etct+1 (97)
πw,t = βEtπw,t+1 − λw [wt − ct − ϕnt] − ξwγwβπt + γwπt−1 (98)
πh,t = βEtπh,t+1 + λ(1 + ϕ)xt + λ[wt − ct − ϕnt] (99)
y∗
t+1 = ρyy∗
t + εy,t. (100)
at+1 = ρaat + εA,t. (101)
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26Table 1: Welfare losses under optimal MP and under alternative Taylor’s
type rules.Welfare losses are in percentage units of steady state consumption. For the
Taylor’s rules are also reported the coeﬃcients of the policy rule minimizing the welfare










φp,H = 2.25;φw = 5
0.0089
φp = 1.25;φw = 4.75
0.0095
φp = 1.25;φp,H = 1.25
0.0529
0.25 0.0151
φp,H = 1.25;φw = 5
0.0254
φp = 1.25;φw = 5
0.0169
φp = 4;φp,H = 1.25
0.0594
0.45 0.0226
φp,H = 1.25;φw = 5
0.0614
φp = 4.25;φw = 3.5
0.0278
φp = 4.5;φp,H = 1.25
0.0608
0.65 0.0259
φp,H = 1.25;φw = 3.5
0.1006
φp = 4.25;φw = 3.75
0.0302
φp = 4.5;φp,H = 1.25
0.0664
Table 2: Standard deviations of several variables under the Optimal Mone-
tary Policy Rule and under several Taylor’s type rules.(%) Standard deviations
have been computed as average over 20 simulations, each 100 periods long.





















































































27Table 3: Correlations among the simulated series obtained under the Fully
Optimal Monetary Policy Rule and the ones obtained under several Taylor’s
type rules.
γw Rule ρ(π) ρ(x) ρ(πw) ρ(πh)
0
πh − πw
π − πw
π − πh
0.2559
0.1794
-0.0862
0.1671
-0.4031
-0.0887
0.1388
0.1242
0.2209
0.2829
0.2231
-0.0582
0.25
πh − πw
π − πw
π − πh
0.9268
0.9571
0.0505
0.8414
0.9573
0.9202
0.0608
-0.0550
0.6105
0.9797
0.9852
0.9006
0.45
πh − πw
π − πw
π − πh
0.8675
0.8949
0.0247
0.9353
0.9730
0.9620
0.1506
0.8067
0.6705
0.9699
0.9892
0.9129
0.65
πh − πw
π − πw
π − πh
0.7756
0.9086
0.0176
0.9424
0.9807
0.9721
0.1056
0.8064
0.6846
0.9295
0.9876
0.8860
28